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IN THE SUP.REME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECELIA WILSON and 
CLARA :MARTIN, 
Plaint,iffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
I 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
No. 9567 
PRELIMINARY STATEl\IENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court 
below. All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents deem it necessary to restate the facts 
for the reasons that Appellant has not stated the facts 
as they must be viewed on appeal, favorable to Respon-
dents, and Appellant has not fully stated the facts. 
This case was tried on the sole issue of whether or 
not the city was negligent in allo·wing a cracked and 
broken manhole cover to be in use at the tin1e and place 
in question. The defendant made no claim of contribu-
tory negligence, and specifically alleged that the city 
had no notice of any defect. (R-11) 
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The area in question is a residential area in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, in the vic,inity of Sixth South and 
13th West. A diagram of the area involved is contained 
in Exhibit 5. 
In answers to interrogatories which were admitted 
into evidence, (Exhibit 10, R-133, 134), the city admitted 
that it put a storm sewer in, commencing at Pueblo 
Street, running thence east on "\V asatch, thence north 
to Arapahoe Avenue, thence east to Navajo Street, thence 
north to Sixth South Street, thence east to Tenth West 
Street, terminating in the Jordan River; the work com-
mencing on .July 28, 1960, and being completed on Octo-
ber 13, 1960. The city had a contract with Evan W. 
Ashby, Contractor, for the installation of this storm 
sewer. Exhibit 5 shows with a wavy line the general 
line of the trench work, digging, and so forth, connected 
with this project as it ran north on Navajo and east on 
Sixth South, near the area in question. 
Witnesses produced by plaintiff testified as to the 
effect of this work on the streets in question. Mrs. Gwen 
Hobbs, who lives across the street from the manhole, 
testified that two weeks before the accident, she noticed 
''some of these great big trucks that carry gravel and 
dirt and top oil, and things like that, and then this 
heavy one, I don't know what they call it,'' operating in 
the area in question. (R-103, 104) In characterizing the 
size of the tractor or grader, she described it as "a big 
thing, because my little girls said it looked like a mon-
ster." (R-104) Furthermore, she stated that any time 
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•J 
any one went over the Inanhole cover she could hear 
a loud noise, "a clang like when smne one lilts a Inan-
hole eover." (R-103) The witnesses who lived in tlus 
area, including Gwen I-:Iobbs, her daughter Carol, Lois 
Casper, and IIarris A. 'Vilson, testified that frorn ap-
proximatel~T two weeks prior to the accident, there were 
gravel and dirt trucks operating in the area, hauling 
gravel and dirt, and traveling on 13th \Vest between 
Sixth South and Arapahoe A venue, and a large velucle 
with steel treads, which was seen operating on 13th West 
between Sixth South and Arapahoe Avenue, which Mr. 
Wilson described as a backhoe, a machine which digs 
trenches and holes. In addition to this, the bus route had 
been changed so that the city bus was traveling over the 
area in question, which its regular route did not cover. 
(R-86, 95, 96, 103, 104, 120, 121, 122, 123) Carol Hobbs 
and Lois Casper, 13V:z and 14¥2 years of age respectively, 
testified as to their observations of the manhole cover 
in question prior to the accident. They also witnessed 
the accident. Carol Hobbs testified that approximately 
one week before the accident she noticed that the manhole 
cover in question ·was broken 1n three parts. 
She testified that there were a large piece and two small 
ones, one of which was missing at that time. (R-85) 
Lois Casper testified that she had observed the manhole 
cover in question a week to a week and half before the 
accident, that it was cracked, and that there was a small 
piece missing. (R-94, 95) Gwen Hobbs testified that 
she had noticed the manhole cover several times before 
the accident; that the first occasion when she noticed the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
1nanhole cover was over a week before the accident. 
At that time she noti~d that the cover was partially 
off and tipped, at which time she and her mother moved 
it back on. She stated that after that occasion she noticed 
that the manhole cover was breaking, at which time she 
noticed there was a piece missing. Also, she noticed 
pieces of the cover lying on the road. On cross examina-
tion, ~irs. Hobbs stated that she had replaced the lid 
twice, once when it was just tipped, and once when it 
was broken, stating that it was in three piece·s, a big 
piece and two smaller ones. 
The remaining piece of the cover, furnished by the 
city, was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 6. Photo-
graphs, furnished also by the city and taken at the 
scene of the accident, were also admitted into evidence 
as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 show 
the re1naining piece of the cover in the street shortly 
after the accident. Exhibit 2 shows the cover substan-
tially as it appeared at the time of trial. It could 
easily be noted on this exhibit and the manhole cover 
itself that there was a break of the supporting cross-
arm, which appeared to be a much olde·r break than 
the rest of the broken surface on said cover. 
Defendant produced witnesses from the Sewer & 
Street Departn1ents of Salt Lake City. Mr. Gay Smith 
testified that the city mspects manholes of the type 
involved in his case once a month, and that the records 
showed that this particular manhole had been inspected 
on July 13, 1960, and had not been inspected again prior 
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to the accident on Augu::;t 20, 1960. (R-146, 147) :Mr. 
James D. ~1oser testified that he rnakes inspections of 
sanitary sewers which are of the type involved herein, 
which includes an inspection of the manhole lid to see 
whether it is in good condition; and that it is very easy 
to ascertain whether or not a sewer lid is cracked frorn 
the sound of the lid when it is allowed to go back in 
place. (R-151, 152) All three witnesses readily agreed 
upon cross examination that any cracked or broken lids 
on manholes were immediately replaced, and that defec-
tive manhole covers were dangerous to auton1obiles. Mr. 
Moser also admitted that occasionally he finds cracked 
and broken lids and that these are immediately replaced. 
(R-153) 
Under proper instructions from the court, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of both plaintiffs and against 
defendant, upon which judgment was duly entered. (R-
178) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE IS A JURY QUESTION 
Since the question to be determined by this appeal 
IS whether or not a jury question was raised by the 
evidence, the evidence must be reviewed in a light mot:_::t 
favorable to plaintiffs. 
". . . unless the question of negligence is free 
from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as 
a question of law; ... if ... the court is in doubt 
whether reasonable men, ... might arrive at dif-
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ferent conclusions, then this very doubt deter-
mines the question to he one of fact for the jury 
and not or1e of law for the court." Newton v. 
O.S.L.R. (1913) 43 U. 219, 134 P. 567, 570. 
The general duty of the city in regard to its streets 
and sidewalks has been stated in Ray v. Salt Lake City 
(1937), 99 U. 412, 69 P.2d 256: 
''It is the duty of a municipal corporation, 
generally speaking, and as a matter of law, to 
use ordinary care and diligence to ke.ep its streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for 
ordinary usage to which they are subjected.'' 
In applying this duty to cities, one of the areas which 
has occupied much attention from the appellate courts 
has been that of notice, and particularly what is tern1ed 
constructive notice. Of course, as a general observation, 
it appears that each case must depend upon its own 
particular fact situation; and generally the question of 
whether or not the city has had constructive notice is 
one of fact for the jury. It is stated at 66 C.J.S., 
NOTT·CE, §11, at page 642: 
''Whatever puts a person on inquiry amounts 
in judgment of law to notice, provided the inquiry 
becomes a duty and would lead to knowledge of 
the facts by the exercise of ordinary intelligence 
and understanding." 
A more elaborate statement is contained in 1IcQuil-
lin, ~iUNICIP AL CORPORATIONS, 3d Ed., Yol. 19, 
§54.109, at page 397 : 
"The municipality is chargeable with notice 
of such defects as ordinary care and reasonable 
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diligence would discover, and the fact that the 
defect is open to common observation is construc-
tive notice. Stated in another way, if facts exist 
"'ith which ignorance is not compatible, except 
on the assumption of failure to exercise reason-
able official care, notice will be presumed. How-
ever, to charge the muncipality with constructive 
notice, it need not be so obvious or notorious as 
to be observed by all." 
At page 405: 
"In determining what length of time will im-
pute notice, regard should be had to the place 
where the defect is, whether in a business or resi-
dence section, whether in a thickly settled or 
sparsely populated district, whether much trav-
eled or suburban; the nature of the defect, whether 
patent or latent, one which cannot but be seen 
by all passers-by, or one so small as to be notice-
able by a fevv only; the apparent danger, whether 
very dangerous as apparent to every one, or mere-
ly a possible but not probable source of danger, 
etc. For example, if one should dig a deep ditch 
across a sidewalk and in no way guard the exca-
vation, so that every person would be obliged to 
go around the ditch or step over it, the danger 
is so great that a very few days' thne would 
impute notice to the municipality. So, notice has 
been imputed in case of a coalhole open frmn 
early in the morning until noon." 
In the implementation of the general rules concern-
ing constructive notice, it has been held that a city must 
anticipate defects which are the natural and ordinary 
result of use and climatic influences; and that a~y situ-
ation which would affect the condition of the stree~ts 
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by reason of the above would give the city a greater 
duty in regard to inspections to discover defects. As is 
stated in 25 Am. Jur., I-IIGI-!\¥ AYS, § 446, at page 738: 
"The duty of the public authority to use 
ordinary care in keeping its highways in a safe 
condition for public travel involves the anticipa-
tion of defects that are the natural and ordinary 
result of use and climatic influences, and it may 
be charged with constructive notice of their exist-
ence by reason of its failure to anticipate them 
and its neglect to Inake sufficiently frequent and 
careful examinations or inspections to enable it 
to discover them. . .. Notice of the occurrence of 
an event or the existence of a condition which, in 
view of particular conditions, may involve poten-
tial danger to travelers, n1ay likewise impose the 
duty of inspection." 
The case of Fackerell v. San Diego, (Cal. 1945), 26 
Cal.2d 196, 157 P.2d 625, involved a situation where 
part of an unimproved sidewalk gave way, causing the 
plaintiff to fall into the hole. The evidence showed that 
the city had constructed this sidewalk approximately 
six months prior to the incident in an area where rain 
could cause erosion. The court held that municipal 
authorities, planning and constructing an improvement 
with kno-wledge of circumstances w·hich reasonably might 
be expected to result in a dangerous condition of the 
improvement, are required to maim inspections cmnmen-
surate in scope with the nature and character of their 
knowledge and a peril which should be avoided. At page 
630 the court stated : 
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"The rules governing constructive notice re-
quire reasonable diligence in making inspections 
for the discovery of unsafe or defective condi-
tions.'' 
This rule was also applied in the case of Argus V-4 
Kiewit, ( 'lV ash. 1957), 49 'V ash. 853, 307 P .2d 261, 
which involved a motorcycle hitting a depression or 
trough three to four inches deep between the gravel on 
a detour road and the main highway. 
Another situation which can accentuate the du(v 
of the rnunicipality to inspect is where a municipality 
has hired an independent contractor to construct street 
improvernents. It is stated at 38 Am.J ur., MUNICIP _._<\..L 
COHPORATIONS, § 600, at p. 297 : 
"Again, a municipality n1ay be liable for in-
juries which result from the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor where, although the municipal-
ity might not be liable for negligent performance 
of the work itself, the municipality failed to per-
form a general duty of supervising the work." 
Cases have unifonnly held that a municipality can-
not divest itself of responsibility for maintaining safe 
streets and sidewalks merely by hiring an independent 
contractor to perform work on said streets and sidewalks. 
The case of Eaton v. Follet (R. I 1927), 48 R.I. 189, 
136 ... <\... 437, involved a situation where an independent 
contractor removing trees near a sidewalk, caused a 
hole in the sidewalk wben he removed one of the trees. 
The evidence as to when the tree had been rernoved 
varied from the same day to several days prior to the 
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InJury. The court held that the municipality cannot, by 
employing. an independent contractor to make street 
repairs, escape liability for injury from the negligence 
of the ,contractor. Its liability was based on its failure 
in leaving the defectjve place unguarded. 
This 'gen'eral duty of supervising the ·work of in-
dependent contractors when their work may affect the 
safety of streets has been upheld in other cases. See 
Scott v. City of Erie7 (Pa. 1929), 297 Pa. 344, 147 A. 68; 
Seamons v. Fitts (R.I. 1899), 21 R-. I. 236, 42 A. 863; 
Welsh v. St. Louis (Mo. 1880), 73 :1Io. 71, and Lu1ulahl 
v. Idaho Falls (Idaho 1956), 78 Idaho 338, 303 P.2d 667. 
Three Utah cases have uniformly held that the 
question of constructive notice is a question for the jury 
under the various fact situations involved. Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City (i894), 9 lT. 491, 35 P. 524 involved 
an injury to plaintiff caused by a stonepile left on the 
city street by an independent contractor, who had a 
contract with Salt Lake City to build a crosswalk. The 
evidence showed that there was no guard or light" at the 
stonepile, although nearby was a large street light. The 
evidence showed that the stones had been at the place in 
question anywhere from three to twelve days before 
the accident. The Suprmne Court affirmed the trial 
court, holding that the question of negligence had been 
properly submitted to the jury under proper instructions. 
In regard to the question of notice., the court stated at 
page 496: 
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""'-N e are also satisfied that the evidence 
shows that the obstruction had been in the street 
such a length of time before. the accident as to 
justify the presumption that the city had, or 
should have had, by the use of reasonable care 
and foresight, notice of such obstruction a suf-
ficient length of time before the accident to have 
properly guarded or removed the same.'' 
The case of Scoville v. Salt Lake City ( 1895), 11 
U. 60, 39 P. 481, concerned' an injury on a sidewalk 
caused by the freezing of water which came down .a 
wastepipe from a building, the water flowing out and 
over the sidewalk. There was evidence indicating that 
there was ice at the point in question all winter, and 
that this ice was accumulating from December to J anu-
ary 7. The court held that notice was properly submitted 
to the jury, stating at page 65: 
"The question of notice to appellant was one 
of fact for the jury to determine, and not a ques-
tion for the court. Elliott, Roads & S., p. 461; 
Dill. Mun. Cor. § 1026. In Wisconsin, where 
a defect in a sidewalk existed one day, and in 
11assachusetts, where a defect in a highway exist-
ed 13 hours, and in Connecticut, a few hours, from 
frozen water, it was held that it was for the jury 
to determ1ne whether that constituted sufficient 
notice. Howe v. City of Lowell, 101 Mass. 99; 
Skeel v. City of Appleton, 49 Wis. 125, 5 N.W. 
27, Gaylord v. City of New BriJtain, 59 Conn. 398, 
20 Atl. 365 ... The question of notice is not alone 
determined from the length of time a defect has 
existed, but also from the nature and character of 
the defect, the extent of the travel, and whether 
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it is in a populous or sparsely-settled part of the 
city." 
Jones v. Ogden City (1907), 32 U. 221, 89 P. 1006, 
involved a case where plaintiff's injuries were caused 
by running into some iron beams and other building ma-
terial lef<t in the street at night at a place where a 
property owner and his contractor were building a side-
walk. The evidence showed that the work in question 
had been in progress for three days, and that the beams 
were delivered at 4 :30 P.M. on the day of the accident, 
the accident happening at midnight. The defendant, 
Ogden City, argued that the,re was no evidence in the 
record tending to show that the city had actual notice 
of the obstructions, or that they had been on the street 
a sufficient length of time to raise a presumption that 
the city had notice of their existence and their unguarded, 
unlighted condition. The court held that the question 
of notice, as well as negligence, were questions o.f fact 
for the jury; that the court erred in directing a verdict 
for the defendant, stating at page 228: 
"The undisputed evidence shows that at the 
time of the accident the work of improving the 
sidewalk along the street had been in progress 
for a considerable length of time. And it furthe-r 
appears that the portion of the sidewalk for which 
the material in question was being used had been 
in course of construction for three days. And it 
may he reasonably inferred from the evidence 
that during the time the material was piled on 
the strHet for use in the construction of the side-
walk it was left at night unguarded and "'-ithout 
lights or signals of any kind to warn the travel-
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ing public of its existence. Furthern1ore, the 
record shows that the place where the accident 
happened is in the very heart or center of the 
business district of the city." 
There have been numerous cases in other States 
which have held the question of constructive notice to 
be one for the jury, in comparable fact situations and 
in many instances where the facts are much less per-
suasive than in the case at bar. llfaddern v. City of 
San Frandsco (·Cal. 1946), 74 Cal. App. 2d 742, 169 P.2d 
425, involved injuries received by plaintiff when the 
pavement of a city street collapsed, and his car sank 
into the depression. The size of the depression through 
which the car had sunk was variously estimated at from 
65 to 80 feet long, 10 to 12 feet wide, and 8 to 10 feet 
deep. T h e pavement collapsed into this depression 
while plaintiff was driving over it. Evidence produced 
by plaintiff showed that two witnesses who worked in 
the close vicinity of the depression had noticed a crack 
in the pavement, lengthwise in the street involved, 
approximately 20 to 30 feet long, 4 or 5· days prior 
to the collapse. These witnesses stated that the crack 
was about 1 Jf2 inches wide and that they could look 
down into it about 2 feet and see concrete. These wit-
nesses did not notify any one at City Hall of these 
observations. Defendant claimed on appeal that there 
was no evidence of notice to defendant of the defect, 
either actual or constructive. In holding this to be a 
jury question, the court stated, at page 432: 
'' ... and we believe that under the authorities 
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the true rule for an appellate tribunal to follow 
is that when reasonable minds may differ regard-
ing the question as to whether defective conditions 
have existed for a sufficient length of time under 
the particular circumstances of the case, to charge 
· a municipality with constructiv~ knowledge there-
pf, the conclusion of the jury in that regard may 
not be interfered with on appeal." 
Skaggs v. General Electric Company (Wash. 1958), 
52 Wash. 787, 328 P.2d 871, involved personal injuries 
incurred when plaintiff tripped and fell over a vehicle 
"Stop" signpost, which was bent across the sidewalk on 
the main thoroughfare of Richland Village. The evi-
dence showed that at appoximately 9 :00 A. M. on the 
day in question an unidentified rnotorist backed his auto-
mobile into the signpost in question, bending it down so 
that the pipe which supported the sign extended across 
the sidewalk at an elevation of 4 to 10 inches. The 
incident in question happened shortly before 4:00 P. M. 
on the same day, when plaintiff, having his attention 
momentarily distracted by the blowing horn of a passing 
autOinobile, tripped over the pipe. The court held that, 
under the general rule of law, it was proper for the 
court to submit the question of constructive notice to 
the jury. 
Gates v. Cifty of Des Moines (Iowa 1949), 240 Iowa 
775, 38 N.W. 2d 96, was a case where the court held the 
question of constructive notice to be one for the jury in 
a situation involving an icy sidewalk in existence for 
approximately 4 days. 
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JVarrcn v. Oity of Los Angeles, (Cal. 1949), 91 
Cal. App. 2d (i78, 205 P.2d 719, involved a slip at a fan-
shaped wet spot approximately 2 feet wide and 3 feet 
long, 1nade slippery by grease and water. There was 
evidence that for 2 months prior to and at the time of 
the accident, there was a hole in the street, approximate-
ly 10 inches by 10 inches, and 2 inches deep, containing 
water and oil. The wet spot on the sidewalk was caused 
by automobiles passing over the hole splashing onto the 
sidewalk. The court held that the question of construc-
tive notice was a question of fact for the jury. 
Crawford v. City of Wichita (Kansas 1935) 141 
Kan. 171, 39 P.2d 911, involved personal injuries re-
ceived by plaintiff driving an automobile during a rain-
stornl, nmning into a manhole over which the cover had 
been displaced by water escaping from the storm sewer 
for approximately 30 minutes. The evidence showed 
that at prior times the cover on the particular manhole 
had come off during rainstorms and that the city had 
replaced it with another cover which was filled in with 
asphalt. There was testimony that a man living near the 
place had called the Street Department about 3 or 4 
months before the injury, informing them that this cover 
would come off during a heavy rainstorm. The court held 
that under the evidence introduced in the case, the jury 
could find that the city had notice of the defect. 
See also Kirack v. City of Ettreka (Cal. 1945), 69 
Cal. App. 2d 134, 158 P.2d 270; Perry v. C~ty of San 
Diego (Cal. 1947), 80 Cal. App.2d 166, 181 P.2d 98; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
Smith v. City of Jefferson (Wis. 1959), 8 Wis.2d 378, 
99 N.W. 2d 119; Alb·ers v. Cincinnati (Ohio 19·60), 111 
Ohio App. 295, 165 N.E. 2d 456; and Moses v. City of 
Natchitoches (La. 1952), Ct. of App., lOth Cir., 58 So. 2d 
292, (Topside of wooden footbridge appeared safe, but 
underside was badly decayed and easily discoverable.) 
It can be seen from the foregoing cases throughout 
the country, as well as the Utah cases, that the question 
of constructive notice has been held to be a question for 
the jury in weaker fact situations than in the case at 
bar. Some of the important considerations which have 
been persuasive on the courts have been how easily 
discoverable the defect is, the amount of traffic, the type 
of area involved, and the extent of the danger involved. 
In the case at bar, viewing the evidence in a light 
rnost favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence shows an 
unusual amount of extraheavy use of the street in 
question for at least two weeks by trucks hauling gravel 
and dirt a n d the large-treaded vehicle variously de-
scribed by witnesses. In addition to this, the bus route 
had even been changed so that city buses would go over 
the area in que·stion. The city was well aware of this 
unusual activity, inasmuch as the city had hired an 
independent contractor to ins.tall a storm sewer in this 
area. As has been se·en in the cases cited, a city cannot 
divest itself of responsibility for dangerous conditions 
caused by independent contractors. In the context of 
this unusual activity, resulting in an extra amount of 
heavy usage of the streets and manhole covers in the 
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area, the jury would be justified in believing from 
plaintiff's evidence that the manhole cover in question 
was cracked and broken for up to one and a half weeks 
before the incident in question; that not only was t!he 
cover cracked and broken, but there was a hole in the 
cover caused by a s1nall piece being broken out and miss-
ing. The manhole cover could be heard to 1nake loud 
noises when being passed over by trucks and vehicles ; on 
occasions the cover was knocked completely off the man-
hole and replaced by one of the witnesses. A person in-
specting or looking for defects in manhole covers could 
easily have discovered the defective manhole cover in 
question. Under the cases a greater duty of inspe:ction 
is given to cities in areas where there is unusual usage 
of the streets, and especially where a large vehicle with 
steel treads is being used on streets. 
Defendant's own witnesses testified as to the ease 
of discovering defects in n1anhole covers merely by the 
sound as the cover is allowed to se.ttle back in place. 
Defendant's own witnesses claim that the city inspects 
such covers as the one in question once a month, although 
in the case at bar admit that it had been approximately 
a month and a week frmn the last inspection of this par-
ticular manhole cover. 
The authorities heretofore cited show that a city 
cannot sit back and wait for complaints. A city has an 
affirmative duty, governed by the various considerations, 
to actively inspect and seek out defects and to remedy 
them. Under the evidence here adduced, reasonable minds 
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could not uniformly say that Salt Lake City should not 
have discovered and remedied the defective manhole 
cover prior to the incident in question. \Vhether or not 
the city should be charged with constructive notice is at 
least a jury question and was properly submitted to the 
jury in the case at bar. The city had its day . in court 
and had its opportunity to submit evidence and argue to 
the jury in this case that it should not be charged with 
notice of the defective hanhole cover. The jury held 
that the city should be charged with such notice, and 
accordingly repudiated the city's argument along these 
lines. The right of a person to have a jury trial should 
be upheld, and the jury verdict and resulting judgment 
in the court below should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
10-7-77 U. C. A. 1953, SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS ACTIONS 
FOR STREET OBSTRUCTIONS. 
10-7-77 U. C. A., 1953, states as follows: 
''TIME FOR PRESENTING~ CONT·ENTS 
- CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ACTION -
Every claim against a city or· incorporated town 
for damages or injury, alleged to have been caused 
by the defective, unsafe·, dangerous or obstructed 
condition of any stre·et, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert or bridge of such city or town, or from 
the negligence of the city or town authorities in 
respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert or bridge, shall within thirty days 
after the happening of such injury or damage be 
presented to the board of commissioners or city 
council of such city or board of trustees of such 
town ... '' 
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The foregoing language specifically waives govern-
mental immunity in cases of defective, unsafe, dangerous, 
or obstructed condition of any street, due to the negli-
genee of the city. This appe·ars to be too clear for argu-
ment. See Niblock v. Salt Lake City (1941), 100 U. 573, 
111 P. 2d 800, and cases cited therein. 
The case of Cob.ia v. Roy City) (Utah 1961), cited 
by the defendant in its brief has no application to the 
case at bar, inasmuch as it had not1hing to do with a 
street obstruction but involved damage resulting from 
the operation by the city of a sewer .. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that whe!ther or not the 
city had constructive notice of the defeetive and danger-
our manhole cover is a jury question. Reasonable minds 
eould well find that the city is charged with constructive 
notice. In keeping with the elements which bear import~ 
antly in determining this question, the following should 
be considered : 
1. At least one and one-half weeks of time in which 
the manhole cover was broken and cracked and easily 
observable by city inspectors. 
2. Unusually heavy use of the street where the man-
hole cover was located, by trucks hauling gravel and dirt, 
buses, and a large steel-treaded vehicle for at least two 
weeks. This activity was caused by an independent con-
tractor of the city, and the city knew of such activity but 
yet made no inspections. 
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3. The defective man'hole cover with the cracks and 
breaks was easily discoverable, not to mention the fact 
that there is shown on the manhole cover a crack which 
appears to be much older than the ones of more recent 
origin. 
4. The defect in the manhole cover caused a situa-
tion which was greatly dangerous to persons driving 
automobiles in the vicinity, with a probability of serious 
injury. 
5. The dangerous condition was easily and quickly 
repairable-the evidence showed that the only thing nec-
essary to be done is to replace a manhole lid with a new 
one, which could be done easily and quickly. 
Under the facts and the law applicable to this case, 
it appears obvious that the question of constructive 
notice was properly submitted to the jury. It is also ob-
vious in view of the specific language of 10-7-77 U.C.A., 
1953, that cities are liable for injuries and damages 
caused by defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed 
streets. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
JOHN L. BLA·CK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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